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ABSTRACT 
 
In the half century since the founding of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the U.S. has spent 
nearly $5 trillion ($2017) to provide cleaner rivers, lakes, and drinking water, or annual spending of 0.8 
percent of U.S. GDP in most years. Yet over half of rivers and substantial shares of drinking water systems 
violate standards, and polls for decades have listed water pollution as Americans’ number one 
environmental concern. We assess the history, effectiveness, and efficiency of the Clean Water Act and 
Safe Drinking Water Act, and obtain four main conclusions. First, water pollution has fallen since these 
laws, in part due to their interventions. Second, investments made under these laws could be more cost-
effective. Third, most recent studies estimate benefits of cleaning up pollution in rivers and lakes which are 
much less than their costs. Either these analyses systematically understate the value of these investments or 
these investments are inefficient. Analysis finds more positive net benefits of drinking water quality 
investments. Fourth, economic research and teaching on water pollution is surprisingly uncommon, as 
measured by samples of publications, conference presentations, or textbooks.  
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In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, lit on fire. A Time magazine (1969) article about 
it attracted enormous attention: 
The Potomac reaches the nation’s capital as a pleasant stream, and leaves it stinking from the 240 
million gallons of wastes that are flushed into it daily. Among other horrors, while Omaha’s meat 
packers fill the Missouri River with animal grease balls as big as oranges, St. Louis takes its 
drinking water from the muddy lower Missouri because the Mississippi is far filthier. … Among 
the worst of them all is the 80-mile-long Cuyahoga … No Visible Life. Some river! Chocolate-
brown, oily, bubbling with subsurface gases, it oozes rather than flows. “Anyone who falls into the 
Cuyahoga does not drown,” Cleveland’s citizens joke grimly. “He decays.”  
Writers attribute many foundational U.S. environmental laws in part to outrage at this fire (Adler 
2002; Dingell 2010). The Cuyahoga has not burned since 1969 and today houses forty species of fish (NPS 
2018).1  
 Water pollution problems are not merely history. Today, over half of rivers and lakes violate 
standards, and 4 to 28 percent of Americans in a typical year receive drinking water from systems that 
violate health-based standards (Allaire et al. 2018; USEPA 2018a). Flint, Michigan, recently exposed 
100,000 residents to dangerously high levels of lead in drinking water, and contaminated drinking water 
leads an estimated 16 million Americans to suffer from gastrointestinal illness each year (Messner et al. 
2006). Some worry whether hydraulic fracturing (fracking) has increased chemicals in water.  
Polls also suggest that water pollution has been Americans’ top environmental concern for at least 
thirty years. Figure 1 shows the percent of respondents to an annual U.S. Gallup poll who say they are 
concerned a “great deal” about various environmental problems. Sixty percent of Americans today list 
                                                            
1 Historically, the 1969 Cuyahoga fire was unremarkable—rivers in Baltimore, Detroit, Buffalo, Philadelphia, and 
elsewhere caught fire throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries, and the Cuyahoga had lit on fire at least thirteen 
times since 1868. The Cuyahoga fire has survived on through music (Randy Newman’s “Burn On” and R.E.M’s 
“Cuyahoga”), food and drink (Great Lakes Brewing sells a Burning River Pale Ale, designed to “ignite the senses 
(not our local waterways)”) and other media. Dr. Seuss’ original version of The Lorax referred to it indirectly, but 
Seuss removed the reference in 1986 after Ohio graduate students wrote him with evidence of decreased water 
pollution. In explanation, Seuss wrote, “I should no longer be saying bad things about a body of water that is now, 
due to great civic and scientific effort, the happy home of smiling fish” (Dierkes 2018). 
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drinking water pollution and also river and lake pollution as a great concern. In every survey since 1989, 
the share concerned about these issues has substantially exceeded the share expressing concern about air 
pollution or climate change, and has also exceeded the share expressing concern about other environmental 
problems (Gallup 2018). A separate poll found that Americans list contaminated drinking water as the third-
most serious health problem facing the U.S. (Firth, Kirzinger, and Brodie 2016). Opinion polls do not 
measure social welfare, but do highlight important political economy forces. 
Motivated in part by the Cuyahoga fire, Congress tried to fix these problems, in 1970 by creating 
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in 1972 by passing the Clean Water Act, and in 1974 by 
passing the Safe Drinking Water Act. A half century later, these laws still manage U.S. surface and drinking 
water pollution. What forces led to these laws? How do they regulate pollution? How effective and efficient 
have they been? Finally, why has recent economic research focused relatively little on water pollution, and 
what can remedy this lack of research? This paper discusses each of these questions in turn.2 
These questions matter because clean water is potentially important for health, recreation, and more 
broadly quality of life. These questions also matter because the U.S. has invested an incredible sum of 
resources to clean up water pollution. The U.S. has spent approximately $4.8 trillion ($2017) to clean up 
surface water pollution and provide clean drinking water since 1970, or over $400 for every American, 
every year (Appendix A). In most years, this spending has accounted for around 0.8 percent of U.S. GDP, 
making clean water arguably the most expensive environmental investment in U.S. history.  
Additionally, these questions are important because they provide an excellent setting to learn about 
externalities, cost-benefit analysis, local public goods, fiscal federalism, regulatory design, non-market 
valuation, and other classic economic issues. Water pollution is literally the textbook example of an 
externality—at least since Stigler (1952, 1966), introductory texts have used the example of a plant dumping 
waste in a river and causing people downstream to suffer to illustrate the concept of externalities.  
                                                            
2 Other economic reviews of water pollution regulation appear in Freeman (2000), Olmstead (2010), Griffiths et al. 
(2012), and Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead (2013). 
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This paper has four main conclusions. First, many measures of drinking and surface water pollution 
have fallen since the EPA’s founding, due at least in part to the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water 
Act.3 Second, these investments could be more cost-effective—they could achieve the same aggregate 
pollution reduction at lower cost, by better utilizing market-based instruments, regulating agriculture, and 
exploiting returns to scale in drinking water treatment. Third, most analyses estimate benefits of regulating 
surface water quality which are less than their costs, which is not the case for most other government 
regulations. Fourth, relatively little economic research focuses on water pollution and its regulation, 
especially relative to research on air pollution. 
Before proceeding, it may be useful to clarify differences between three types of waters. The Clean 
Water Act regulates surface waters (rivers, lakes, and some ocean areas). The extent to which the Clean 
Water Act regulates groundwater, which includes subsurface aquifers, is legally disputed (Brownhill and 
Rosen 2018). The Safe Drinking Water Act regulates drinking water, which includes groundwater or 
surface water that is purified by a drinking water treatment plant and then transported by pipe to households 
and businesses. 
 
I. What Forces Led to the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act? 
Health provided a historic rationale for water quality policy. Sanskrit texts from 4,000 years ago 
describe purification methods for drinking water that are still used today. Even Roman bureaucrats under 
Augustus Caesar sought to eliminate lead piping since it was “hurtful to the human system” (Raucher 1996). 
For centuries, typhoid and cholera caused a large number of deaths. John Snow’s (1855) famed study of 
London, which provided early evidence that water transmitted cholera, is sometimes considered the 
founding of modern epidemiology and quasi-experimental research. In the early 20th century, many cities 
began chlorinating and filtering drinking water, and cholera and typhoid rates plummeted (Cutler and Miller 
                                                            
3 William Ruckelshaus, first head of the Environmental Protection Agency, summarizes, “Even if all of our waters 
are not swimmable or fishable, at least they are not flammable” (Mehan 2010). 
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2005; Alsan and Goldin forthcoming). By the 1950s, these investments had nearly eliminated U.S. cholera 
and typhoid epidemics, and so weakened the health-based rationale for additional investment.  
Before the 1970s, the U.S. largely left water quality up to cities and states, but their policy and 
enforcement was limited. The federal government created some drinking water standards in the early 20th 
century, but as of 1969, only 59 percent of drinking water systems met these standards (USPHS 1970). For 
surface waters, federal laws before the Clean Water Act, had limited power. A 1948 law included 
regulations that Congress described as “almost unenforceable,” President Eisenhower called water pollution 
a “uniquely local blight,” and many cities considered rivers to be a public sewer. Regulators often 
summarized, “The solution to pollution is dilution” (Milazzo 2006). After one of the Cuyahoga River fires, 
for example, Cleveland prohibited refineries from discharging oil into the Cuyaoga. Violation of this 
ordnance was only punished with a $10 fine, which was rarely applied (Adler 2002).  
The environmental movement helped change this inattention to water pollution. The first Earth Day 
in 1970 included 20 million people, and was among the largest demonstrations in U.S. history. Proximate 
causes of the environmental movement include expanding industrialization producing new pollutants, 
photographs of Earth taken from space, a major 1969 oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, 
and the 1969 Cuyahoga River fire. Deeper causes may have included broader social activism and rising 
national incomes, together with the fact that clean water is a normal good. Several studies also strengthened 
support for the Clean Water Act and Safe Drinking Water Act and helped shape both laws (Zwick and 
Benstock 1971, Harris 1974). 
The Cuyahoga River fire was the most immediate cause of the Clean Water Act. The most 
immediate cause of the Safe Water Drinking Act was the discovery in 1973 of dozens of chemicals, 
including potential carcinogens, in the drinking water of New Orleans and Pittsburgh (Raucher 1996). New 
Orleans area residents at the time described their drinking water as tasting “oily-petrochemical,” and fish 
from the nearby Mississippi River as unsellable due to chemical tastes (USEPA 1972; Agee 1975).  
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Several aspects of politics from the 1950s and 1960s affected water pollution policy in the 1972 
Clean Water Act and beyond. First, discussions of surface water pollution had little reference to health.4 
Second, because industry opposed regulation, policymakers focused on subsidies to wastewater treatment 
plants rather than industrial regulation. Third, to assuage concerns that southern states were attracting 
manufacturing with weak regulation, policymakers created uniform national standards. Finally, to ensure 
political support from rural representatives, investment disproportionately targeted small towns (Milazzo 
2006).  
 
II. How Do These Laws Regulate Pollution? 
Clean Water Act 
The Clean Water Act’s general goals were implausibly ambitious: eliminating discharge of all pollutants 
into navigable waters by 1985; making all water safe for fishing and swimming by 1983; and prohibiting 
all discharge of toxic amounts of toxic pollutants.5 The Clean Water Act was incredibly popular at its 
inception. President Nixon vetoed the Clean Water Act, due to costs that he called “unconscionable” and 
“budget-wrecking,” but bipartisan majorities in the Senate (52-12, with 36 Senators not voting), and the 
House (247-23, with one “present” and 160 abstentions) voted to override the veto (CQ Almanac 1972). 
The Clean Water Act’s first main policy involved grants to cities to improve wastewater treatment 
plants. In most cities, underground pipes transmit polluted water from homes and businesses to a wastewater 
treatment plant which abates pollution before discharging treated water to a river, lake, or ocean. The U.S. 
has around 15,000 such plants.  
                                                            
4 In one debate on the floor of the U.S. House, the main House supporter of this legislation, Congressman John 
Blatnik, went into what an aide called a “health tirade.” His staff expunged these remarks from the Congressional 
Record and replaced them with the written speech text linking water quality and quantity. His staff believed that the 
lack of waterborne communicable disease epidemics after World War II made health the weakest argument for 
pollution abatement (Milazzo 2006, p. 29). Today, the Clean Water Act is perhaps the only major environmental 
regulation of the 1970s and 1980s which does not have health as a main goal (Cropper and Oates 1992). 
5 Technically the 1972 law was called the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972. We follow 
common practice in referring to it as the Clean Water Act. 
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Congress allocated grant funding across states based on formulas considering state population, 
forecast population, and wastewater treatment needs (CBO 1985). Within a state, grants were allocated 
based on a “priority list” that states submitted annually to the EPA. These grants began in 1957 under 
predecessor laws to the Clean Water Act, though their scale increased after 1972. In total, the federal 
government provided around 35,000 grants. Projects funded by these grants between 1960 and 2005 cost 
about $870 billion over their lifetimes ($2017)—about $230 billion in federal grant funds, $110 billion in 
municipal matching funds, and $530 billion in operation and maintenance costs (Appendix A).6 In 1987, 
the grants program transitioned to a subsidized loan program, the Clean Water State Revolving Fund.  
The Clean Water Act’s second main policy involved permits distributed to sources discharging 
pollution from a fixed source (e.g., a pipe) into navigable surface waters—the National Pollution Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES). Each permit describes the levels of pollution the plant may discharge. These 
permits focus on five conventional pollutants (e.g., bacteria like fecal coliform) and 126 “priority” toxic 
pollutants, though may cover other water quality measures (USEPA 2010). The EPA oversees 120,000 such 
permits (USEPA 2018c).  
 
Other Components of the Clean Water Act 
We highlight a few other historic and current concerns in Clean Water Act regulation. In part because the 
Clean Water Act largely ignores agricultural pollution, agriculture contributes to some of the worst surface 
water quality problems. This includes a massive “Dead Zone” in the Gulf of Mexico where oxygen levels 
fall too low to support most aquatic life and significant degradation of the Chesapeake Bay. For political 
economy and technical reasons, regulators have found it difficult to regulate pollution from agriculture.  
 A second challenge involves recent litigation. In the last 15 years, judicial rulings have restricted, 
reinstated, and then again restricted Clean Water Act protections for roughly half of U.S. waters, primarily 
                                                            
6 These figures represent U.S. EPA grants distributed from 1960 to 2005 per Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming). 
Corresponding operations and maintenance costs are calculated as in Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) and represent 
costs attributable to these capital investments through 2014.  
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wetlands, headwaters, and intermittent streams.7 The Clean Water Act only protects “Waters of the United 
States”; these debates are litigating which waters that clause protects. The net benefits of these regulations 
have also become controversial (Boyle, Kotchen, and Smith 2017). 
 A third issue involves hydraulic fracturing (fracking). Fracking extracts natural gas or crude oil 
from underground shale rock, typically by combining horizontal drilling with the high-pressure injection 
of water, chemicals, and sand. Fracking has increased U.S. gas and oil production, but has inspired concerns 
of contaminating ground and surface waters due to chemicals leaking from underground wells, improper 
cement casing around the well, or improper storage of fracking liquids in surface ponds. The 2005 Energy 
Policy Act exempted fracking from a portion of the Safe Drinking Water Act which regulates underground 
injection of contaminants, but fracking is fully subject to the Clean Water Act.  
 A fourth challenge is the rapid expansion of pollutants. U.S. industry produces 85,000 chemicals; 
industrial and wastewater treatment plants only seek to treat a far smaller number. For example, a General 
Accounting Office (1994) analysis of 236 industrial plants found that their NPDES water pollution permits 
ignored over three-fourths of the types of toxic pollutants they emitted, and many of these ignored toxic 
pollutants were known to cause health risks. Moreover, the toxic pollutants not on the Clean Water Act’s 
“priority” list account for 98 percent of discharges by mass in a national emissions database, the Toxic 
Release Inventory.  
 Finally, we mention a few additional challenges briefly. Some cities have a single set of 
underground pipes designed to transmit both wastewater and rain from storms; severe rainfall overwhelms 
wastewater treatment plants in such cities and leads these combined sewer systems to discharge raw 
untreated sewage and wastes into surface waters. Power plants create enormous water demand for cooling, 
in total accounting for 40 percent of total U.S. water withdrawals (Hutson et al. 2003). Thermal pollution 
from power plants can be constrained by NPDES permits specifying high river temperatures on precisely 
                                                            
7 The Supreme Court Rapanos and SWANCC decisions restricted Clean Water Act protection for these waters; the 
Obama administration’s 2015 Waters of the United States Rule (also called the Clean Water Rule) sought to 
reinstate it; many states sued to vacate the rule; and in 2017 President Trump issued an executive order to rescind or 
revise the rule. 
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the summer afternoons when electricity demands are high. Third, some air pollution abatement technologies 
convert pollution from air to water, and increasingly stringent air pollution regulation may be increasing 
surface water pollution (Greenstone 2003; Duhigg 2009; Gibson forthcoming). Fourth, the EPA has begun 
using a new tool, Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) requirements. A TMDL specifies the maximum 
level of discharge for a specific pollutant which a water body can receive in order to meet desired uses, then 
describes changes in emissions needed from each source to achieve the desired use. The EPA has issued 
75,000 TMDLs since 1995 (USEPA 2018a). Fifth, cap-and-trade markets for surface water pollution have 
been uncommon, small, and plagued by transaction costs; expanding the scope of such trading could 
substantially increase the cost effectiveness of water quality policy (Fisher-Vanden and Olmstead 2013). 
Finally, the Clean Water Act set national water quality standards for different desired uses; regulators have 
debated the appropriate levels of these standards and the extent to which they should vary across space and 
desired use. 
 
Safe Drinking Water Act 
Broadly, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) seeks to protect health by limiting drinking water 
contamination. The law was also popular at its passage—it passed with a voice vote in the Senate and 296-
84 in the House (CQ Almanac 1974).  
The SDWA includes three main policy instruments. The first involves setting and enforcing 
drinking water standards. The EPA sets an enforceable “maximum contaminant level” for 94 contaminants, 
including microorganisms like E. Coli; radionuclides like uranium; organic chemicals like glyphosate 
(Roundup); inorganic chemicals like cyanide; and disinfectants and their byproducts like chlorine (USEPA 
2015, 2018b). The EPA also sets non-enforceable “secondary standards” for contaminants like taste, color, 
and smell, which have primarily aesthetic importance. A water system can violate these standards by 
exceeding contaminant limits, failing to treat water appropriately, or failing to report tests (USEPA 1999). 
Water systems can also avoid violations strategically, for example by oversampling when initial readings 
exceed limits (Bennear, Jessoe, and Olmstead 2009).  
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While the EPA designs standards, states enforce them, typically using administrative orders, 
modest civil penalties, or prison (Tiemann 2007). Enforcement is incomplete.  In fiscal year 1987, for 
example, 3 percent of violations led to any state enforcement, and only five hundredths of a percent of 
violations led to EPA enforcement actions (Munson 1989). 
The SDWA’s second main policy involves protecting groundwater from contamination. This 
includes regulations of wells drilled for underground fluids (the Underground Injection Control Program); 
designation of some aquifers as primary drinking water sources, which then prevents any federal funds for 
purposes that could contaminate these aquifers (the Sole Source Aquifer Program) and protection of areas 
around groundwater wellheads (the Wellhead Protection Program). 
The SDWA’s third main activity involves subsidies for drinking water. One set of subsidies funds 
drinking water treatment, distribution networks, and related infrastructure. Another provides grants for 
managing databases, conducting surveys, and other information management activities. A third provides 
grants and subsidized loans to rural communities for drinking water and wastewater treatment.   
The SDWA regulates roughly 150,000 public and private water systems. About 50,000 of these 
(“community water systems”) provide water to year-round households; the others supply other sites like 
schools, factories, campgrounds, and such. The largest 400 community water systems cover nearly half the 
U.S. population, while the smallest 28,000 systems cover only 2 percent of the population (Tiemann 2017). 
The SDWA does not regulate domestic wells, which serve about 45 million Americans, or bottled water, 
which is regulated by the Food and Drug Administration. About 70 percent of community water system 
customers receive water from systems with surface water sources, while the others have groundwater 
sources (USEPA 2009). 
We also discuss a few current concerns involving the SDWA. First is the choice of contaminants. 
The SDWA regulates 94 of about 85,000 industrial chemicals; many unregulated chemicals are believed to 
be toxic and are found in drinking water, including some pesticides and pharmaceuticals (Sullivan, Agardy, 
and Clark 2005). Concern about toxic chemicals in drinking water is longstanding and magnified by popular 
media, including Rachel Carson’s 1961 book Silent Spring and more recently the films “Erin Brockovich” 
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and “A Civil Action.” One contaminant common in drinking water but not regulated is per- and 
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFASs), used to repel water and oil. These chemicals appear in non-stick 
cookware, pizza boxes, and many other products, and may contribute to cancer and infant health problems; 
EPA is deciding whether to regulate them.  
A second concern involves lead, a toxic metal which retards brain development. Lead typically 
appears in drinking water due to plumbing materials including pipes or soldering. The SDWA has used 
increasingly stringent provisions to remove lead from drinking water systems. Recent crises in Flint, 
Michigan, and elsewhere underscore its continuing challenge.  
A third concern involves fracking. Some are concerned that fracking has allowed chemicals to 
penetrate groundwater, which then feeds into drinking water. Evidence on the prevalence of such pollution 
is mixed, though households appear willing to pay reasonable sums to avoid such potential contamination 
(Mason, Muehlenbachs, and Olmstead 2015; Muehlenbachs, Spiller, and Timmins 2015; Wrenn, Klaiber, 
and Jaenicke 2016). 
A fourth set of concerns involves wells and small drinking water systems. In part because many 
abatement technologies have increasing returns to scale (Olmstead 2010), water quality regulations are 
weaker for small or intermittent drinking water systems, and nonexistent for rural wells. The smallest 
drinking water systems are often most likely to violate standards.  
 
III. How Effective Have These Laws Been? 
Relevant Parameters 
The extent to which the Clean Water Act and SDWA affect pollution depends on a few legal and 
economic parameters. One is de jure and de facto stringency—to what extent did standards require 
substantial changes? Moreover, did regulators test water, notify and punish violators, and change behavior?  
A second issue involves compliance. What was the cost for sources to decrease pollution? 
Compliance costs also depend on invention of new abatement technologies and on the costs of existing 
abatement technologies (which can decrease through learning by doing, economies of scale, or innovation). 
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Additionally, compliance depends on the ability of sources to circumvent these laws—for example, by 
relocating emissions or reclassifying economic activity.  
 
Evidence 
Existing research does not typically speak to these individual channels, but does indicate aggregate 
changes in pollution. Surface water treatment has improved substantially since the early 1970s. In 1940, 
municipal wastewater treatment plants removed about 20 percent of a common measure of pollution 
(biochemical oxygen demand), and by 2016, they removed 70 percent of it (USEPA 2000). Industrial 
treatment has also expanded—in 1954, only 13 percent of water used in large U.S. manufacturing plants 
had any treatment before discharge; by 1982, 30 percent did (U.S. Census 1971, 1986).  
Several studies find evidence of decreased surface water pollution. Some use small sets of 
monitoring sites (Smith, Alexander, and Wolman 1987, USEPA 2000), though one finds no change for 
dissolved oxygen in a large sample of lakes (Smith and Wolloh 2012). A national water quality simulation 
model also suggests substantial decreases in ambient pollution due to observed changes in emissions 
(Bingham et al. 2000). More comprehensive evidence comes from 50 million pollution readings from 
240,000 monitoring sites (Keiser and Shapiro forthcoming). That analysis finds that most pollutants have 
declined substantially, though agricultural pollutants like nitrates have not. It also finds that the rate of 
decrease for most pollutants has slowed over time.  
Figure 2 shows an example of this evidence of the substantial decrease in U.S. surface water 
pollution since the Clean Water Act. This graph uses 14.6 million pollution readings covering 265,000 
monitoring sites over the period 1972-2014. This graph shows a common omnibus measure of water 
quality—whether waters are safe for fishing.  
Figure 2 shows that when the Clean Water Act passed in 1972, nearly 30 percent of water quality 
readings were unsafe for fishing. This share has trended steadily downward, and by 2014, only about 15 
percent were. Appendix Figure 1 shows similar patterns for the four physical pollutants underlying this 
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measure of whether waters are fishable. For the period 1962-2001, Appendix Table III of Keiser and 
Shapiro (forthcoming) shows similar trends in many sensitivity analyses. 
Some studies directly attribute some of the change in pollution to the Clean Water Act. Keiser and 
Shapiro (forthcoming) use a triple-difference research design comparing areas upstream versus downstream 
of wastewater treatment plants and before versus after plants receive grants and across many plants; they 
find that Clean Water Act grants significantly decrease pollution for 25 miles downstream and for 30 years. 
Inspections and fines, implemented through NPDES regulation, decrease pollution from wastewater 
treatment plants and pulp and paper manufacturing (Magat and Viscusi 1990; Laplante and Rilstone 1996; 
Helland 1998; Earnhart 2004; Shimshack and Ward 2005).  
Evidence on trends in drinking water quality and treatment is less clear, though suggests 
improvements. The share of community water systems which treat water at all grew substantially between 
the 1970s and 1990s (USEPA 1999). In 1969, 40 percent of systems violated standards, while in 2015, only 
10 percent did, even as standards tightened (USPHS 1970; Allaire, Wu, and Lall 2018).8 Figure 3 shows 
data from a recent study of 18,000 community drinking water systems over the period 1982-2015. This 
graph shows that violations jump discretely each time the SDWA incorporates tighter standards, and then 
the frequency of violations gradually declines as water systems become more likely to comply with the new 
rule (Allaire, Wu, and Lall 2018). Over this period, 10 to 45 million people per year drank water violating 
health standards.  
Limited evidence directly analyzes the effects of the SDWA and its subsequent amendments. 
Bennear and Olmstead (2008) find that the SDWA requirement to send annual water quality reports to 
customers decreased total and health-based water quality violations by more than a third. Grooms (2016) 
shows that mean arsenic concentrations in California follow a slightly decreasing trend through the early 
2000s, but abruptly fell 50 percent in 2008 when arsenic standards were tightened. Nigra et al. (2017) find 
                                                            
8 These 1969 and 2015 statistics are not perfectly comparable—each takes a non-random sample of drinking water 
systems, and they focus on different measures of violations.  
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that arsenic concentrations in a sample of Americans decreased for individuals using public water systems 
but not for individuals drinking well water, in tandem with arsenic regulations in public systems. 
 
IV. How Efficient Are These Laws? 
Determining how these policies affected pollution does not indicate how they affect well-being. 
Analysis of social welfare often involves assessment of the consumer surplus that people obtain from any 
decreases in pollution resulting from these policies (including due to health, recreation, and other channels); 
the lost producer surplus from firms due to complying with these regulations; and deadweight loss of 
taxation associated with government spending. 
Research has used a range of methods to investigate these questions. To measure the benefits of 
cleaner water, some studies look at changes in where people travel for boating, fishing, or swimming (travel 
cost methods); others analyze changes in home values (hedonic methods); others look at investments in 
defensive goods like bottled water (averting investments); others look at health consequences; and others 
use stated preference methods (contingent valuation methods and choice experiments). Stated preference 
methods are the most common approach for estimating the value of surface water quality, though have been 
controversial (Diamond and Hausman 1994; Hausman 2012; Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 2012); health-based 
methods are the most common approach for estimating the value of drinking water quality. To measure the 
costs of providing clean water, some studies use accounting data from surveys of firm expenditures on 
pollution abatement; others use engineering estimates of the costs of abatement technology; and others use 
reported government accounts.  
Table 1, row 1, shows estimates of the total cost of cleaning up surface water pollution, providing 
clean drinking water, and abating air pollution over the period 1970-2014 (Appendix A provides details). 
Over this period, we calculate total spending of $2.8 trillion to clean up surface water pollution, $2.0 trillion 
to provide clean drinking water, and $2.1 trillion to clean up air pollution ($2017). By each measure, total 
spending to clean up surface water pollution alone exceeded total spending to clean up air pollution. Total 
spending to clean up surface plus drinking water pollution exceeded total spending to clean air pollution by 
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70 to 130 percent. Of course, abatement expenditures do not represent the total change in producer 
surplus—for example, they represent market prices rather than surplus, abstract from market power and 
any associated loss to customers, and ignore general equilibrium effects (Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro 
Forthcoming).  
Figure 4 shows these total spending patterns by year. Between 1973 and 1987, annual spending to 
clean up surface waters was only slightly higher than spending to clean up air pollution, at $40 to $63 billion 
per year. Spending on drinking water treatment was much lower, at $17 to $37 billion per year. Since 1987, 
spending to treat surface and drinking waters has steadily increased, which could reflect regulation of more 
toxic pollutants or maintenance of aging infrastructure.  
Table 1, rows 3-5, summarizes benefit-cost analyses of 240 regulations the federal government 
implemented over the period 1992-2017. This table distinguishes five categories of regulations: surface 
water; drinking water; air pollution; greenhouse gases; and all other (including non-environmental). This 
table shows that four of these five categories of investments pass a benefit-cost test. For example, estimated 
total benefits from air pollution regulations exceed their estimated total costs by a factor of 12. For drinking 
water, total benefits are estimated to exceed total costs by a factor of 5. Surface water quality is the only 
one of these five categories of investment which fails a benefit-cost test—estimated total benefits are only 
80 percent of estimated total costs. The next row in Table 1 describes the mean regulation—again all 
categories have a favorable benefit/cost ratio except surface waters, where the mean regulation has benefits 
that are 57 percent of its costs. The last row of Table 1 describes the share of regulations which are estimated 
to have benefits smaller than their costs. For surface water regulations, 67 percent of regulations fail a 
benefit-cost test; for drinking water regulations, only 20 percent do, and for air pollution regulations, only 
8 percent do.  
To make this comparison clearer, Figure 5 shows a histogram of these air and water pollution 
analyses. This Figure makes the conclusion even clearer—most recent federal surface water quality 
regulations have estimated benefits which are smaller than their estimated costs. By contrast, most air 
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pollution regulations have estimated benefits which far exceed their estimated costs. Other studies using 
other samples of regulations find similar conclusions (Hahn 2000; Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro 2018).  
 This stylized fact, that most cost-benefit analyses estimate negative net benefits of surface water 
quality regulations, leads to a critical question. Do investments to clean up surface waters actually create 
negative net benefits to the U.S., or is existing research underestimating their benefits? Keiser, Kling and 
Shapiro (Forthcoming) describe several ways in which estimates of benefit-cost ratios may be 
systematically biased downwards, including: ignoring health benefits; using restrictive models of pollution 
transport; under-counting non-use values (e.g., people may be willing to pay to clean up the Mississippi 
River even if they never visit it); ignoring general equilibrium channels; excluding toxic and other non-
conventional pollutants; incorrectly assuming that people have complete information about water pollution; 
and excluding benefits from groundwater and ocean waters.  
It is also worth emphasizing that failing a cost-benefit test does not imply the U.S. should not invest 
in surface water quality. Apart from the fact that these analyses may underestimate true benefits, they also 
reflect the policy instruments and investments actually made. Using more cost-effective instruments, 
targeting investments to areas with greatest net benefits, and other reforms can achieve greater benefits for 
the same cost. Policymakers may also value other objectives, like equity. 
 
V. Why a Dearth of Economic Research? 
Given the importance of water quality and tis regulation, surprisingly little economic research 
analyzes it. Table 2 describes several measures of research we constructed. Publications are perhaps the 
most relevant measure. Two to three times more JSTOR economics articles focus on the Clean Air Act than 
the Clean Water Act. In the top five economics journals, 53 articles discuss the Clean Air Act but only 5 
discuss the Clean Water Act or the Safe Drinking Water Act. Conference presentations provide another 
measure of research activity. At NBER Summer Institute sessions on energy and environmental economics 
(EEE) over the years 2009-2018, 24 papers focused on air pollution, 3 covered surface water pollution, and 
only 2 covered drinking water pollution. We also reviewed eight leading graduate and undergraduate 
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environmental economics textbooks. The mean book spent two and a half times more pages discussing air 
pollution than discussing water pollution. We also reviewed two undergraduate textbooks in public finance; 
they spent 3-6 pages discussing air pollution and did not discuss water pollution.  
We now turn to discuss several reasons why little economic research has focused on water pollution 
and its regulation, and mention progress on some. One challenge involves linking water pollution to 
outcomes. Levels and regulations of many environmental goods – air pollution, weather, climate, toxic sites 
– affect crop yields, health, land values, crime, firm productivity, firm outsourcing, capital investment, 
income, and labor earnings in ways that econometrics can detect and analyze. Researchers have less 
consensus on whether and to what extent such choices and outcomes respond to drinking or surface water 
pollution, which may discourage research in this area. It is unclear if this uncertainty is because water 
pollution actually has smaller effects on economic choices and outcomes, or because water pollution’s 
effects are more difficult to detect. The difficulty in detection could be because the effects are smaller, or 
because the spatial links between water pollution and its benefits are more complex. 
A second challenge is the limited availability of data on surface or drinking water pollution. In part 
this is because surface water pollution monitoring more often requires a person visiting (e.g., in a boat) to 
take samples and potentially analyze in a lab, and because the EPA does not operate a standard national 
monitoring network. Because many organizations collect these data, using a range of methods and devices, 
in varying locations, it can also be complex to determine to what extent existing water quality data are 
accurate, representative, and comparable across time and space. Appendix B.3 of Keiser and Shapiro 
(forthcoming) does describe several methods to assess and address these issues. 
One development that has improved access to surface water quality data is the Water Quality Portal 
(www.waterqualitydata.us). Fully introduced in June 2018, it provides streamlined access to three federal 
data repositories—Modernized STORET, the National Water Information System, and STEWARDS. It 
covers about 300 million water quality records, 2.4 million monitoring sites, and 450 monitoring 
organizations (Read et al. 2017). This Portal excludes the largest federal data repository, STORET Legacy, 
which includes 200 million water samples from 700,000 monitoring sites, over roughly the years 1900-
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1998. STORET Legacy is more difficult to parse, though EPA plans eventually to incorporate it into the 
Water Quality Portal. Remote sensing (i.e., satellite) measures of water color and clarity are also becoming 
available (Lee et al. 2014). For groundwater, one smaller repository, the National Ground-Water 
Monitoring Network, measures water quality in about 2,000 wells. 
The most comprehensive source for drinking water quality data is the Tap Water Database, 
compiled by a nonprofit, the Environmental Working Group. Since 2010, this database has sought to collect 
data from states. The EPA’s main database, the Safe Drinking Water Information System (SWDIS), begins 
earlier but only reports violations and not pollution concentrations. The EPA also keeps a database of annual 
reports that water utilities send consumers (Annual Water Quality Reports), and maintains some records of 
regulated and unregulated contaminants (the National Occurrence Database).  
A third challenge involves assessing where and when water pollution and its regulation are relevant. 
Because economic research on water pollution regulation is not widespread, there is no general consensus 
on how to measure it. Some recent progress in data availability may help. The Clean Watershed Needs 
Survey provides a panel census of the roughly 15,000 wastewater treatment plants that receive household 
and some business waste in most U.S. cities. The Grants Information and Control System (GICS) provides 
data on over 35,000 grants the federal government gave cities through the Clean Water Act to improve 
wastewater treatment. The EPA keeps records of inspections and enforcement actions against violators of 
the Clean Water Act—these data were formerly known as the Permit Compliance System and a newer 
improved version is the Integrated Compliance Information System (ICIS) system. The Pollution 
Abatement Costs and Expenditures Survey for many years collected information on firms’ capital and 
operating costs to address pollution emissions. Many of these datasets have existed for decades, though 
have gradually become more widely accessible. 
A fourth challenge involves research designs. Because water quality regulation is relatively uniform 
across space, it has been difficult for economists to identify effects of regulation by comparing regulated 
against unregulated areas. This concern is less pronounced for other environmental goods—the Clean Air 
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Act, for example, has nonattainment designations which vary according to ambient air levels across 
counties and time, and weather varies idiosyncratically across space and time.  
A fifth challenge involves spatial computation. For studying air pollution and climate change, 
simple geographic aggregates like counties or states provide a reasonable unit of analysis. For water 
pollution, analyzing patterns at the level of individual river segments and their upstream and downstream 
relationships can be informative. A few advances have made this more feasible. One is the National 
Hydrography Dataset, which provides a georeferenced atlas of every U.S. water feature. Software and 
computing advances have also made such calculations more feasible. ArcGIS, QGIS, C++, and the National 
Hydrography Dataset have streamflow algorithms, and several papers now exploit the direction of 
streamflow (Ebenstein 2012; Lipscomb and Mobarak 2017; Garg et al. 2018; Keiser and Shapiro 
forthcoming). Also useful is the development of increasingly detailed measures of water regions, 
technically called Hydrologic Unit Codes (HUCs).  Since 2000, the Watershed Boundary Database has 
defined more spatially detailed HUCs, which can provide a simpler alternative to upstream and downstream 
calculations. The most detailed, 12-digit HUCs, distinguish 100,000 separate local water areas (USDA 
2018). 
A sixth challenge is the choice of pollutants. The surface water pollution repositories discussed 
earlier describe over 16,000 different measures of pollution, and it is unclear which 1-2 measures matter 
most. Some studies focus on one or a few omnibus measures of water pollution, though the chosen measure 
varies by study—Sigman (2002) and Lipscomb and Mobarak (2018) use biochemical oxygen demand 
(BOD); Duflo et al. (2013) use BOD, chemical oxygen demand (COD), and a few others; Keiser and 
Shapiro (forthcoming) focus on whether waters are safe for fishing and on dissolved oxygen, though also 
discuss results from other physical pollutants.   
 
VI. Conclusions 
Access to clean water has been a central issue in human health for millennia. Historic water pollution spread 
typhoid, cholera, and other infectious disease, leading to high infant and urban mortality around 1900. Partly 
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in response to the environmental movement, the U.S. in 1970 created the Environmental Protection Agency, 
and then passed two sweeping laws designed to improve water quality—the Clean Water Act and the Safe 
Drinking Water Act. 
 A half century later, many measures of drinking and surface water quality have improved, in part 
because of these laws. U.S. rivers used to light on fire regularly, and since the Clean Water Act have done 
so rarely if ever. Industrial, sewage, and drinking water pollution have all decreased (though agricultural 
pollution remains prevalent). 
 These investments have not been cheap. On average they have cost 0.8 percent of U.S. GDP per 
year, or over $400 for every American, every year. These investments are potentially important, and also 
popular. In surveys over the past 30 years, for example, Americans every year list drinking and surface 
water pollution as their top two environmental concerns. Investments in drinking water appear to create 
substantial health benefits which exceed their estimated costs. 
 Surprisingly, however, existing evidence suggests that estimated costs of most investments in 
cleaning up rivers, lakes, and oceans exceed their measured benefits. In part for these reasons, two Supreme 
Court cases, an Obama Administration Executive Order, and the Trump Administration have all litigated 
whether to rescind Clean Water Act protections for about half of U.S. surface waters. Is existing analysis 
systematically undercounting the benefits of these investments? Unfortunately, economic research on water 
pollution and its regulation has been limited. Better understanding the extent to which these investments in 
surface water pollution create net benefits to the U.S., and ways to make these investments more effective, 
is critical.
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Figure 1 
Share of Americans Concerned “A Great Deal” about Various Environmental Issues, 1989-2018 
 
  
Source: Gallup (2018). Each poll asks, “I’m going to read you a list of environmental problems. As I read 
each one, please tell me if you personally worry about this problem a great deal, a fair amount, only a little 
or not at all.” The graph shows four issues to avoid too many lines obscuring the main patterns. Results for 
other issues, which are not surveyed in all years, include the following: loss of tropical rain forests (mean 
share 40 percent), extinction of plant and animal species (38 percent), contamination of soil and water by 
toxic waste (54 percent), damage to Earth’s ozone layer (42 percent), acid rain (28 percent), loss of natural 
habitat for wildlife (51 percent), ocean and beach pollution (51 percent), maintenance of the nation’s fresh 
water for household needs (48 percent), and contamination of soil and water by radioactivity from nuclear 
facilities (49 percent). Stated concern about drinking water and also river and lake pollution equals or 
exceeds stated concern about each of these other issues in nearly every year of the survey.
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Figure 2 
U.S. Surface Water Pollution, 1972-2014 
 
 
Note: This definition of “fishable” is the most widely used in research; it was developed by William 
Vaughan for Resources for the Future and reflects published water quality criteria and state water quality 
standards between 1966 and 1979. Formally, “Fishable” readings have biochemical oxygen demand below 
2.4 mg/L, dissolved oxygen above 64% saturation, fecal coliforms below 1,000 MPN/100 mL, and total 
suspended solids below 50 mg/L. Graph shows year fixed effects plus a constant from regressions that also 
control for monitoring site fixed effects, a day-of-year cubic polynomial, and an hour-of-day cubic 
polynomial.  Each observation in the regression is an individual pollution reading at a specific monitoring 
site; the dependent variable in the regression takes the value one if it violates the fishable standard and zero 
otherwise. Connected dots show yearly values, dashed lines show 95% confidence interval, and 1972 is the 
reference category. Standard errors clustered by watershed. Graph summarizes 14.6 million pollution 
readings from 265,000 monitoring sites from Storet Legacy, Modern  Storet, and the National Water 
Information System.  See Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) for details on the data cleaning procedure. 
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Figure 3 
U.S. Drinking Water Quality Violations, 1982-2014 
 
 
Note: Data from Allaire (2018) and cover a balanced panel of 17,900 community water systems.  Vertical 
lines show years of the most important changes in standards (Total Coliform Rule in 1990, Stage 1 Drinking 
Water Byproducts rule in 2002, and Stage 2 Drinking Water Byproducts rule in 2013). Each point shows 
the share of community water systems violating a health-based standards.
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Figure 4 
Annual Investments to Clean Pollution in Surface Waters, Drinking Water, and Air, 1970-2010 
 
 
Note: See sources and details in Appendix A. Expenditures include public and private sources, industry, 
agriculture, transportation (e.g., catalytic converters and reformulated gasoline), and all other sources with 
available data. Air pollution line only shows annual values for 1973 to 1990 since these are the years with 
the most reliable data; available air pollution expenditure estimates for other individual years require 
imputation or interpolation. All values deflated to $2017 using the Engineering News Record Construction 
Price Index.
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Figure 5 
Estimated Benefit-Cost Ratios of Federal Regulations of Air Pollution Versus Surface Water 
Pollution  
 
Note: Data from “Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates,” 
various years. See Table 1 for further details.
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Table 1. 
Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations 
 
  
Note: Column (5) covers all regulations not in columns (1)-(4). For years after 2004, data are from Table 
A-1 of the “Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal Regulations and Unfunded Mandates 
on State, Local, and Tribal Entities.” For earlier years, data are from various tables of predecessor reports. 
For studies which estimate a lower bound and upper bound on costs or benefits, this table averages the two. 
When costs or benefits are estimated for multiple discount rates, this table uses values for a 3% discount 
rate. When studies present multiple estimates for other reasons, this table averages the multiple estimates. 
Table includes the few studies which report negative costs (i.e., cost savings). It also includes studies which 
contain notes that their benefits or costs are incomplete in specific known ways. This table excludes 
regulations with unreported benefits or unreported costs, or regulations with benefits and costs not reported 
in monetary terms, or in non-comparable monetary terms. Greenhouse gases includes energy efficiency 
regulations. For studies listing only a bound (e.g., benefits up to 10 million), this table uses the bound. 
Regulations affecting emissions from all media (e.g., regulating manufacture and disposal of PCBs) are not 
listed as air or water policies. Total U.S. Expenditures reflect public and private investments (see Appendix 
A), and are not readily available for greenhouse gases or all other regulations (columns 4-5).
Surface 
Water
Drinking 
Water Air
Greenhouse 
Gases All Other All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Total U.S. Expenditures ($2017 trillion)
1970 to 2014 $2.83 $1.99 $2.11 — — —
1973 to 1990 $0.94 $0.49 $0.85 — — —
Regulations Analyzed in Federal Reviews
     Total: Benefits / Total Costs 0.79 4.75 12.36 2.98 1.97 6.31
     Mean Benefits / Mean Costs 0.57 8.26 15.18 3.64 21.79 16.17
     Share With Benefits < Costs 0.67 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.15
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Table 2 
Prevalence of Economic Research on Air Versus Water Pollution 
 
Note: Economics journal articles include all JSTOR mentions of "Clean Air Act," "Clean Water Act" or 
"Federal Water Pollution Control Act," or "Safe Drinking Water Act," searched 11/20/2018. Top 5 
economics journals includes the American Economic Review (excluding Papers and Proceedings issues), 
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics, and Review of Economic 
Studies. NBER Summer Institute data includes Environmental and Energy Economics (EEE) sessions. 
Articles using general pollution sources (Toxic Release Inventory, Superfund sites, total pollution 
abatement costs) are counted as half each in air and surface water pollution; NBER counts exclude 5-minute 
("egg timer") presentations. In textbooks, for air pollution, counts include page mentions in the index of 
topics starting with the phrases “clean air,” “CAA,” “air pollution,” “air quality,” or “air pollutants,” though 
excluded references that were clearly to climate change or atmospheric ozone depletion.  For water 
pollution, we counted page mentions starting with the phrases “clean water,” “FWPCA,” “federal water,” 
“water quality,” “water pollution,” “safe drinking,” “SDWA,” or “drinking water.” The environmental 
textbooks include  Chapman (2000), Goodstein (2002), Berck and Helfand (2011), Kolstad (2011), Callan 
and Thomas (2013), Anderson and Libecap (2014), Freeman, Herriges, and Kling (2014), and Phaneuf and 
Requate (2017). The public finance textbooks include Rosen (2002) and Gruber (2011).
Air
Surface 
Water
Drinking 
Water Air/Surface
Air/(Surface+
Drinking)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Economics journal articles (JSTOR)
     JSTOR economics 972 377 72 2.6 2.2
     JSTOR economics years 2000- 416 156 30 2.7 2.2
     JSTOR Top 5 economics journals 53 3 2 17.7 10.6
NBER Summer Institute Presentations, 2009-2018 24 3 2 8.0 4.8
Environmental Economics Textbooks # Pages
     Mean 30 15 6 2.0 1.4
     Median 22 10 5 2.2 1.5
Public finance textbooks Mean # Pages 4.5 0 0 — —
Type of Pollution Ratio: Air v. Water
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Appendix Figures and Tables 
 
Appendix Figure 1 
U.S. Surface Water Pollution Trends, 1972-2014, Additional Pollutants 
 
Panel A. Biochemical Oxygen Demand   Panel B. Dissolved Oxygen Saturation Deficit 
    
 
 
 
 
Panel C.  Fecal Coliforms    Panel D. Total Suspended Solids 
   
Note: see notes to Figure 2.
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Appendix A: Estimates of Spending on Air and Water Pollution Control Programs 
This appendix describes available data on the total costs of investments in surface water quality, 
drinking water treatment, and air pollution abatement. We construct estimates of spending using a 
number of sources. These include Keiser and Shapiro’s (forthcoming) analysis of the Clean Water 
Act municipal grants program, Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro’s (forthcoming) analysis of benefits and 
costs of surface water quality programs, a Congressional Research Service report on federal 
appropriations of surface and drinking water programs at US EPA (Copeland 2015), a 
Congressional Budget Office (2018) report on public spending on transportation and water 
infrastructure, and a report on local spending on water and wastewater services from the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (2010). We also use a number of reports by US EPA detailing costs of the 
Clean Air Act and Keiser and Shapiro’s (forthcoming) analysis of spending on air pollution control 
programs. Obtaining comprehensive spending estimates in each of these areas faces a number of 
challenges including incomplete reporting across communities and across time and the potential 
for double counting of federal, state, and local spending. 
 
This Appendix reports a range of estimates; the main text highlights the best available estimates. 
We also focus on the period 1970 to 2014 since spending estimates for each of these categories 
are more complete for this period. We deflate all estimates to $2017 using the Engineering News-
Record Construction Cost Index.   
 
Surface Water Quality – Preferred Estimate: $2.8 trillion (range of $1.9 to $3.0 trillion)  
Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) and Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro (forthcoming) report estimates 
of spending on surface water quality pollution control programs that are driven primarily by federal 
policies (i.e, the Clean Water Act’s municipal grants program and the Clean Water Act’s State 
Revolving Funds program), industrial spending on water pollution abatement, and nonpoint source 
programs sponsored by the federal government such as a number of U.S. Department of 
Agriculture conservation programs.  
Federal Spending – Preferred Estimate: $0.6 trillion (range of $0.5 to $0.6 trillion)  
To account for federal government funds, we use Keiser and Shapiro’s (forthcoming) estimate of 
spending on grants to local municipalities and net out local matching expenditures on capital, 
operations, and maintenance costs. We add spending estimates on the federal portion of Clean 
Water State Revolving Funds (CWSRFs) from Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro (forthcoming). These 
sources suggest approximately $370 billion in direct federal spending on wastewater treatment. 
This estimate exceeds Copeland’s (2015) estimate of $256 billion in total appropriations for 
wastewater treatment programs, though Copeland’s estimates start in 1973. This estimate also 
exceeds CBO’s (2018) estimate of total federal spending on both wastewater and drinking water 
treatment ($363 billion). However, Copeland’s federal appropriation estimates for drinking water 
only total $26 billion, which suggests CBO’s total estimate is likely largely due to wastewater 
treatment. Each source suggests similar patterns in funding over time, with much greater amounts 
in the 1970s. We use the estimates from Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) as they reflect estimates 
of grant spending recovered from US EPA records and Clean Water State Revolving Funds 
estimates from US EPA. 
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In addition to these funds, we include spending on non-point source control programs from Keiser, 
Kling, and Shapiro (forthcoming) that primarily reflect spending on USDA conservation programs. 
This adds an additional $219 billion. Our preferred estimates for total federal spending on 
wastewater treatment is thus $589 billion with a range of $475 billion to $589 billion. 
Local Spending - Preferred Estimate: $1.6 trillion (range of $0.8 to 1.7 trillion)  
Our estimates of local spending on wastewater treatment comes from CBO (2018) and the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (2010). We first take annual spending estimates from CBO (2018) that 
represent state and local spending for infrastructure, net of federal grant and loan subsidies. These 
estimates represent both wastewater and drinking water spending. To apportion this spending 
between wastewater and drinking water, we use the U.S. Conference of Mayors (2010) report that 
provides estimates of the share of local spending by decade between wastewater and drinking 
water treatment. The CBO (2018) and U.S. Conference of Mayors (2010) estimates of total 
spending on wastewater and drinking water treatment track each other closely and are based on 
similar census data. However, the U.S. Conference of Mayors local spending estimates may also 
reflect federal grants and subsidies. For example, CBO’s estimates of federal contributions to 
wastewater and drinking water total $363 billion. This figure added to CBO’s estimate of $3.6 
trillion in state and local spending net of federal spending closely approximates the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (2010) estimate ($3.92 vs. $3.87 trillion).     
Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro (forthcoming) present estimates of local spending tied to federal and 
state programs (i.e., the Clean Water Act grants and CWSRF). These estimates are broadly similar 
through 1986 ($251 billion for Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro vs. $348 billion for CBO and the 
Conference of Mayor estimates). The main divergences occur after 1986, corresponding to a sharp 
decline in the federal grants program. Since Keiser, Kling, and Shapiro focus on spending tied to 
federal programs while CBO includes local spending independent of federal grants, the CBO 
estimate is likely to be more complete.    
Our preferred estimate of local spending is thus $1.6 trillion with a range of $801 billion to $1.7 
trillion. The Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) local estimate reflects our lower bound and the U.S. 
Conference of Mayors (2010) report reflects our upper bound.   
Industrial - Preferred Estimate: $0.6 trillion  
Our estimates of industrial spending are based on Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) and Keiser, 
Kling, and Shapiro (forthcoming). These estimates are based on Pollution Abatement Costs and 
Expenditures (PACE) surveys from 1973 – 1986, 1988 – 1994, and 2005.  
Drinking Water Quality – Preferred Estimate: $2.0 trillion (range of $2.0 to $2.2 trillion) 
Federal Spending - Preferred Estimate: $26B  
We use Copeland’s (2015) estimate of federal appropriations for Drinking Water State Revolving 
Funds, which started in 1997. These total $26B.  
Local and State Spending - Preferred Estimate: $1.9 trillion (range of $1.9 to $2.1 trillion) 
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To estimate local and state spending, we follow a similar protocol for drinking water as for 
wastewater. We allocate CBO’s (2018) estimate of total local spending net of federal contributions 
based on the U.S. Conference of Mayors (2010) estimate of the share of spending assigned to 
wastewater versus drinking water. This yields an estimate of $1.9 trillion in local and state 
spending on drinking water treatment. The U.S. Conference of Mayors (2010) estimates provide a 
slightly larger figure at $2.1 trillion.  
Air Pollution Control – Preferred Estimate: $2.1 trillion (range of $2.1 to 2.7 trillion) 
We use EPA’s (1997) retrospective analysis of the Clean Air Act as the main source for 
expenditures on air pollution control. These expenditures represent additional spending due to the 
Clean Air Act. We do not observe expenditures from before the Clean Air Act, so these estimates 
may provide a lower bound on total spending. EPA (1997) estimates annual expenditures on 
compliance costs for 1973 to 1990. For 1970 to 1972, we assume annual expenditures equal 
expenditures in 1973. While expenditures in 1973 were the lowest of any year, expenditures in 
real dollars remained fairly steady over this time period ($41.3B in 1973 versus an average of 
$47.2B per year for 1973 to 1990).  
Recovering annual estimates after 1991 is more challenging. Table 1 assumes that annual estimates 
for 1991 to 2014 equal the average expenditures from 1973 to 1990. This is a strong assumption, 
since the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 may have increased spending. However, a separate 
prospective study by US EPA for 1990 to 2020 (US EPA 2011) provide similar estimates of total 
spending over this time period. For example, our cost estimates for 2000 to 2014 are $708 billion, 
which is roughly similar to estimates of $877 billion from EPA. We construct an upper range 
estimate given a few of these sources. First, we use EPA’s restrospective estimates until 1988. We 
then assume a jump in costs due to the CAAA that correspond to an increase we observe in the 
PACE data through 1994. We then assume constant cost estimates constant for 1995 to 2000. For 
2001 to 2014, we assume costs increase by the same level of changes as in USEPA (2011). This 
procedure requires substantial imputation and interpolation, which is why Figure 5 does not show 
values for these years, and why Table 1 separately reports estimates for years where such 
imputation is not needed. This yields an upper bound estimate of $2.7 trillion.   
Keiser and Shapiro (forthcoming) discuss an additional source of estimates from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis for the years 1972 to 1994. These estimates place expenditures on air pollution 
abatement at $1.1 to $1.6 trillion. Our estimates using the EPA retrospective analysis provide 
similar estimates over this time period of $1 trillion. 
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